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ARTICLES
ACHIEVING BALANCE IN THE DEVELOPING
LAW OF SANCTIONS*
A. Leo Levin**
and Sylvan A. Sobel***

The Brendan Brown Lecture Series was inaugurated at the Columbus
School of Law of The Catholic University of America in most auspicious
fashion by Chief Judge Edward D. Re of the United States Court of International Trade.' Tributes to Brendan Brown are to be found in the pages of
this law review and elsewhere. 2 Suffice it to say simply that his career provided another example of decanal scholarship, following in the tradition established by men like Wigmore, McCormick, and Erwin Griswold.3 It is a
great honor to join the very distinguished company of Brendan Brown
lecturers.
To understand the developing law of sanctions it is necessary to go back to
the 1980 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.4 At that time
three Justices of the Supreme Court dissented from the promulgation of the
proposed amendments, not because the amendments were "inherently objectionable," but because the dissenters believed that the proposed changes "fall
* This article is an expanded version of the Brendan Brown Lecture delivered by A. Leo
Levin on February 24, 1987 at the Columbus School of Law of The Catholic University of
America in Washington, D.C. The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors and not
necessarily those of the Federal Judicial Center. On matters of policy the Center speaks only
through its Board.
** Director, Federal Judicial Center. B.A., 1939, Yeshiva College; J.D., 1942, University

of Pennsylvania; LL.D., 1960, Yeshiva University; LL.D., 1980, New York Law School.
*** Assistant to the Director, Federal Judicial Center. B.A., 1977, Georgetown Univer-

sity; J.D., 1983, University of Wisconsin.
1. Re, The Lawyer as Counselor and the Prevention of Litigation, 31 CATH. U.L. REV.

685 (1982).
2. See Re, supra note 1; Markey, Thomas More-Circa 1975, 21 LoY. L. REv. 807
(1975); Papale, A Tribute to Dr. Brendan F Brown, 21 LOY.L. REV. 803 (1975).
3. On the rich tradition ofdecanal scholarship, see Chadbourn, Charles T. McCormickThe Legal Scholar, 28 TEx. L. REV. 12 (1949).
4. Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 446 U.S. 997 (1980) [hereinafter 1980 Amendments].
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short of those needed" to accomplish reforms in civil litigation that would
address the twin problems of abuse of discovery and the cost of litigation.5
The 1983 amendments, 6 and particularly the amendment to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 11,7 have been subjected to criticism with a very different
5. Id. at 997-98 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell was joined by Justice Stewart and
Justice Rehnquist.
6. Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 461 U.S. 1095 (1983). Rules 7,
11, 16, and 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended in 1983 as part of what
Professor Arthur Miller, the reporter to the Advisory Committee, has called "an integrated
package." A. MILLER, THE AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 2 (Federal Judicial Center 1984). Rule 7 was amended to make explicit that the
certification requirement and sanctions provisions of rule 11 are applicable to motions and
other papers. FED. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(3). Rules 16 and 26 were amended, in part, to include the
following sanctions provisions:
If a party or party's attorney fails to obey a scheduling or pretrial order, or if no
appearance is made on behalf of a party at a scheduling or pretrial conference, or if a
party or party's attorney is substantially unprepared to participate in the conference,
or if a party or party's attorney fails to participate in good faith, the judge, upon
motion or his own initiative, may make such orders with regard thereto as are just,
and among others any of the orders provided in Rule 37(b)(2)(B), (C), (D). In lieu of
or in addition to any other sanction, the judge shall require the party or the attorney
representing him or both to pay the reasonable expenses incurred because of any
noncompliance with this rule, including attorney's fees, unless the judge finds that
the noncompliance was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an
award of expenses unjust.
FED. R. CIv. P. 16(f).
Every request for discovery or response or objection thereto made by a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an
attorney shall sign the request, response, or objection and state his address. The
signature of the attorney or party constitutes a certification that he has read the
request, response or objection, and that to the best of his knowledge, information,
and belief formed after a reasonable inquiry it is: (1) consistent with these rules and
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification,
or reversal of existing law; (2) not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; and
(3) not unreasonable or unduly burdensome or expensive, given the needs of the case,
the discovery already had in the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance
of the issues at stake in the litigation. If a request, response, or objection is not
signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to
the attention of the party making the request, response or objection and a party shall
not be obligated to take any action with respect to it until it is signed.
If a certification is made in violation of the rule, the court, upon motion or upon its
own initiative, shall impose upon the person who made the certification, the party on
whose behalf the request, response, or objection is made, or both, an appropriate
sanction, which may include an order to pay the amount of the reasonable expenses
incurred because of the violation, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g).

7. As amended in 1983, rule 11 provides:
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall
be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose address
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thrust: there has been concern that they are too radical, threatening basic
change in the role of the advocate and his or her relations with both court
and client.'
Such concern is not altogether groundless, as will be demonstrated below.
Our thesis, however, is that the courts are taking a balanced approach to the
interpretation and application of the provisions of these amendments, and
that the new and evolving "jurisprudence of sanctions" promises to provide
some useful correctives to the litigation problems it addresses while avoiding
excesses that would indeed pose the risk of negative side effects.
We begin with the language of the rule, quoting only that portion which is
immediately relevant: "If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in
violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall
impose upon the person who signed it [the lawyer], a represented party [the
litigant], or both, an appropriate sanction... ." Sanctions for violations are
thus made mandatory and may be imposed upon the court's initiative in the
absence of a motion by an opposing party. The plain meaning of the rule
makes this much clear, and commentators and cases are in accord.° Moreshall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading,
motion or other paper and state his address. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit.
The rule in equity that the averments of an answer under oath must be overcome by
the testimony of two witnesses or of one witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished. The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by
him that he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his
knowledge, information and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is wellgrounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the
extension, modification or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for
any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not signed, it
shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in
violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose
upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction,
which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the
reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other
paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
8. See, e.g., Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11-Some "Chilling"
Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1338-52
(1986); Note, PlausiblePleadings: Developing Standardsfor Rule 11 Sanctions, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 630, 633-44 (1987) [hereinafter Plausible Pleadings]; Comment, Reasonable Inquiry
Under Rule 11-Is the Stop, Look. and Investigate Requirement a Litigant's Roadblock?, 18
IND. L. REV. 751 (1985) [hereinafter Reasonable Inquiry]; Snyder, The Chill of Rule 11, 11
LITIGATION, Winter 1985, at 16; Rothstein & Wolfe, Innovative Attorneys Starting to Feel
Chill From New Rule 11, Legal Times, Feb. 23, 1987, at 18, col. 1.
9. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.

10. See, e.g., Unioil, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 809 F.2d 548, 559 (9th Cir. 1986); Al-
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over, on closer analysis, it also appears clear that so long as a violation is
apparent to the court, sanctions are mandatory even where no adversary has
so moved. The provisions do, indeed, carry the potential for far-reaching
change.
To provide perspective, it is helpful to recognize that an amendment of
this type to rules of procedure typically reflects the social and intellectual
climate of the times. This is certainly true in the case of the sanctions
amendments, which were adopted amidst concern over frivolous lawsuits,
discovery abuse, and unfair litigation tactics-all perceived as contributing
causes to the rising cost of litigation." The emphasis on sanctions as a remedy also reflects the courts' experience with increased resort to sanctions
under other rules and statutes, 12 and the promulgation of the new rules
promised to accelerate this trend. Indeed, the amendments were designed to

encourage imposition of sanctions. Lest anyone fail to discern this much
from the rules themselves, the Advisory Committee, in the official notes,
explicitly said so. 3
The amendments became effective in August 1983, almost four years ago,
and appellate opinions are being handed down in increasing numbers. They
are beginning to form patterns; contours are emerging. Accordingly, it is
time for a report card. On the whole, in our view the grades are good; the
results of the first few years under the revised sanctions regime are favorable.
bright v. Upjohn Co., 788 F.2d 1217, 1221-22 (6th Cir. 1986); Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 770
F.2d 1168, 1174-75 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d

243, 254 n.7 (2d Cir. 1985) (EastwayI); Nelken, supra note 8, at 1321-22. But cf Schwarzer,
Sanctions Under the New FederalRule 11-A CloserLook, 104 F.R.D. 181, 200 (1985) ("It is
not likely that courts will consider themselves bound by the rule's mandatory language to
impose sanctions.").
11. See, e.g., 1980 Amendments, supra note 4, 446 U.S. at 1000-01 (Powell, J.,
dissenting);
ABA Section of Litigation, Second Report of the Committee for the Study of Discovery Abuse,
reprinted in 5 LITIGATION NEws, April 1980, at 9; AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION
OF LITIGATION, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF DISCOVERY
ABUSE (1977); see generally Levin & Colliers, Containingthe Cost of Litigation, 37 RUTGERS

L. REV. 219, 219-22 (1985); Sofaer, Sanctioning Attorneys for Discovery Abuse Under the New
Federal Rules: On the Limited Utility of Punishment, 57 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 680, 681-83
(1983).
12. See Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1273 (2d Cir. 1986) (discussing 1980 amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1927), cert. denied, 55 U.S.L.W. 3602 (U.S. Mar. 10, 1987); see generally
Levin & Golash, Alternative Dispute Resolution in FederalDistrict Courts, 37 U. FLA. L. REV.
29, 51-58 (1985). Moreover, interest in sanctions as a means of curbing abusive litigation
practices is not limited to the federal courts. It was reported more than one year ago that
"nearly a dozen states have adopted the new Rule 11 since 1983." Federal and State Judges
Levy Stiff Penalties on Lawyers Who Abuse Legal Process, 4 ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH
COST OF LITIGATION, February 1986, at 3, 12.
13. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note ("The new language is intended to
reduce the reluctance of courts to impose sanctions.").
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It is fair to say that frivolous suits are being sanctioned, and hopefully
deterred, and that unethical excesses in litigation are being restricted, and
hopefully deterred. 14 At the least, litigation costs and attorneys' fees are
being shifted to give relief to innocent parties at the expense of those guilty
of grossly improper conduct. 5 Appellate courts have, on the whole, been
deferential to trial judges, but affirmances have not come as a matter of
course. Where there has been a failure of the trial court to act in cases that

appear clearly to demonstrate sanctionable conduct, reversal has followed. 6
Perhaps of greater significance, when trial judges attempted too much, when
the rule was read as authority for sanctioning conduct that hardly could be
viewed as egregious, where the reach of the rule was extended to a point that
did, indeed, threaten to chill zealous advocacy, the appellate courts have, on
the whole, been hesitant to follow.

7

A review of recent cases will illustrate what rule 11 sanctions can accomplish. First, however, we will consider what sanctions cannot do, and what
sanctions should not be allowed to do. Finally, in light of these considerations, we will explore some technical aspects of the rule, as reflected in judicial decisions and in the theories on which they rest.
I.

WHAT SANCTIONS CANNOT

Do;

ALLOWED

WHAT THEY SHOULD NOT BE

To Do

There has been much talk of a litigation explosion and of unwarranted
14. See, e.g., Nelken, supra note 8, at 1333 ("The sheer number of cases in which attorney's fees have been awarded for violation of rule 11 cannot fail to have a generalized deterrent
effect on lawyers."). We agree that it is reasonable to infer that increased use of sanctions has
had, or will have, such a deterrent effect. Proof of causation in this context is, of course,
notoriously difficult, the more so since so little time has elapsed since the rule became effective.
15. For a discussion of the cost-shifting aspects of rule 11 sanctions, see A. MILLER, supra
note 6, at 17, 28, 39. See also Symposium, Amended Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: How Go the Best Laid Plans?, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 29 (1985) (remarks of
Judge Charles Sifton) ("I submit that [rule 11] is being enforced in an effort to shift the cost,
the crushing cost of litigation, in recognition of the fact that one of the injuries that can occur
in this society is the injury that is inflicted by the receipt of one's own lawyers' bill.").
16. See, e.g., Albright v. Upjohn Co., 788 F.2d 1217 (6th Cir. 1986); Westmoreland v.
CBS, Inc., 770 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
In Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 (2d Cir. 1985) (Eastway
I), the court of appeals reversed the district court's denial of a motion for attorneys' fees, and
remanded to the district court to impose sanctions, including expenses and attorneys' fees. On
remand, the district court discussed the mitigating factors pointing toward imposition of minor
sanctions, and awarded $1,000 in attorneys' fees as a sanction. Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City
of New York, 637 F. Supp. 558, 584 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (Eastway II).
17. See, e.g., Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1280 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 55
U.S.L.W. 3602 (U.S. Mar. 10, 1987); Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801
F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986); Kamen v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 791 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1986).
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filings.'" Sanctions cannot be expected to effect a radical reduction in filings,
which are now running at about 250,000 civil cases per year in the federal
system.' 9 If fear of sanctions were to induce 2,500 plaintiffs not to bring
lawsuits they had contemplated, a reduction of only one percent would result, assuming that the rate of increase were held to zero. Similarly, reports
of discovery abuse and of the enormous cost of litigation are common.2 °
But, in the vast majority of cases, there is no oppressive discovery, and one
study has shown that in half of federal civil cases there is no discovery at
all. 2'
This does not imply that there are no problems or that they are not serious. The problems in the litigation system have been likened to a pollutant.22 As in a clear reservoir, it does not take much to contaminate the
whole. It does not take much to make the contamination evident, particularly when the pollutants are strikingly visible, be they in the form of mammoth cases that command great public interest, with seemingly endless
discovery followed by interminable trials, or patently frivolous cases that
make for good media copy-both of which can be a serious burden to the
courts.
How much can sanctions help? We should neither overestimate nor underestimate their effectiveness.
In the first two years after the amendment to rule 11, there were 233 reported district court cases in which sanctions under the rule were considered.23 Recent review of reported decisions indicates that in less than twice
that time the number has tripled; 24 sanctions have clearly become a significant issue in a growing number of cases. Moreover, there are surely many
more cases, not reported, in which informal sanctions have been imposed.25
Based not only on the numbers, but on the reported cases, it appears fair to
18. See, e.g., Address by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68
A.B.A. J. 274, 275 (1982). For an opposing view on the question of excessive litigation, see
Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3 (1986).
19. Civil filing in the 12-month period ending September 20, 1986 totaled 246,733. For
the 12-month period ending September 20, 1985, civil filings totaled 279,965. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL WORKLOAD STATISTICS

1, 18 (Sept. 1986).
20. See supra note 11.
21. P. CONNOLLY, E.

HOLLEMAN & M. KUHLMAN, JUDICIAL CONTROLS AND THE
CIVIL LITIGATIVE PROCESS: DISCOVERY 28 (Federal Judicial Center 1978).
22. See A. MILLER, supra note 6, at 19.

23. Nelken, supra note 8, at 1326.
24. One recent survey found that there have been at least 500 reported district court cases
since August 1, 1983 in which rule 11 sanctions were considered. Rothstein & Wolfe, supra
note 8. Our LEXIS search on March 5, 1987 generated more than 700 district court cases that
contain discussion of sanctions in connection with rule 11.
25. See Nelken, supra note 8, at 1326; Rothstein & Wolfe, supra note 8.
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say that increased resort to sanctions is having some impact.26 It can and
does provide important relief to the litigants and the judges involved; it can
and does add respect for the law.
The underlying premise of the Advisory Committee that formulated the
1983 amendments is that the imposition of sanctions has the capacity to
modify conduct. More is involved than fee-shifting in the particular case;
the Advisory Committee chose to emphasize the deterrent effect of the new
rule 11. Indeed, as the Committee's notes point out, the very choice of the
title to the rule-"Sanctions"-was intended to emphasize the deterrent
aspect.27
However, if sanctions have the capacity to modify conduct in a way that
improves the litigation process, they could also have the capacity to modify
conduct in other ways as well; they might deter conduct that we do not want
deterred because it is considered socially desirable. Specifically, there is at
least the risk that the threat of sanctions might deter a zealous advocate
from litigation designed to attack or dilute precedent 28 that he or she believes should be overruled. Classic examples of such precedents abound, and
chilling the zeal of those who would achieve change through litigation would
be counterproductive. 29 Moreover, the more severe the sanctions imposed,
the greater the risk of a chilling effect. Simply put, there is the possibility, if
not the probability, that misapplied sanctions would have undesirable side
effects.
Sanctions must not be allowed to chill advocacy or to infringe upon the
loyalty owed to clients. There is no disagreement on this point. The Advisory Committee made clear that "the rule is not intended to chill an attorney's enthusiasm or creativity in pursuing factual or legal theories." a The
Second Circuit, even as it reversed the trial judge for failure to impose sanctions, asserted that it did "not intend to stifle the enthusiasm or chill the
creativity ' 'a of advocates, characterizing those attributes as "the very life26. Moreover, the figures discussed in the text relate only to rule 11. As noted supra note
6, amendments to other rules form part of the "integrated package." The number of sanctions
under these rules has not been reflected in these figures; however, they have probably

increased.
27. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note; see National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976) (referring to deterrent effect of sanctions on
"other parties to other lawsuits" in "other district courts").
28. See Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 558, 574-75 (E.D.N.Y. 1986)
(Eastway II) ("Unless Rule 11 is applied in a way that minimizes the tension between creativ-

ity and sanctions, a chilling effect seems inevitable.... Bad court decisions must be challenged
if they are to be overruled, but the early challenges are certainly hopeless.").

29. See supra note 8.
30. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
31. Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 (2d Cir. 1985) (Eastway I).
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blood of the law."' 32 And, as if this was not sufficiently persuasive, the opinion continues: "Vital changes have been wrought by those members of the
bar who have dared to challenge the received wisdom, and a rule that penalized such innovation and industry would run counter to our notion of the
33
common law itself.",
Such statements, however eloquent, only serve to begin analysis, not to
conclude it. It is important to recognize while assuring that zeal and creativity remain undeterred in fact as well as in theory, what they do not properly
include. Zealous representation never included subornation of perjury. Nor
did zealous representation ever include unethical conduct. This much is universally conceded.
Defining what is and what is not unethical has, however, proved more
difficult and more controversial. Even where there is agreement in principle
that it is unethical to conduct discovery for the purpose of draining an adversary financially, the principle has too often been honored in the breach.
Neither in theory nor in practice does the proposition receive the same acceptance as that concerning perjury. Too many of the practicing bar have
been prone to add caveats and exceptions. The sanction rules, and the holdings interpreting them, present a great educational opportunity-the opportunity to articulate and to enforce standards of litigation conduct that
encourage zealous advocacy within the limits of the attorney's obligations as
an officer of the court.
A second point is closely related. It is sometimes said that sanctions infringe on the independence of counsel. Sanctions are somehow lumped together with the phenomenon known as "managerial judges," 34 and both are
considered undesirable, if not reprehensible.
Judges should, however, be "managers" of their own caseloads. Independence of counsel does not and should not include a license to start a lawsuit
and allow it to languish, either because more important cases have come into
the office, or because opposing counsel has asked for a continuance and is
owed a favor. True, a claim is a private matter. Once filed, however, a case
becomes public business. Thus, with due concern for the legitimate interests
of litigants and counsel, a court should assure that a case moves expeditiously and fairly to resolution. The concept of judges as case managers is
35
generally accepted today.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982).
35. See generally, Oliphant, Rule 11 Sanctions and Standards.- Blunting the Judicial
Sword, 12 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 731, 743 (1986) ("Even attorneys who see themselves as
vigilant guardians of every aspect of a client's case, no longer oppose stronger judicial involve-
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Sanctions can help judges manage their caseloads in the small percentage
of cases in which sanctions are necessary. Indeed, rule 16(f) is based on this
premise. 3 6 The obligation, however, to manage a caseload is independent of
the authority to impose sanctions under the federal rules.
II.

SANCTIONS IN ACTION-APPLICATIONS OF RULE

11

One can imagine a range of situations in which rule 11 sanctions may be
applicable. Such cases may run from the clearly frivolous claim, to the notquite-so-frivolous motion made for an improper purpose, to the situation
where the manner in which a case is being litigated, rather than the substance of the litigation, is called into question. Confronted with cases of
these types, the courts are beginning to define the boundaries of the rule.
In McLaughlin v. Bradlee,"' the plaintiff conducted a "seven-year campaign of litigation" against those involved in certain investigations and prosecutions in which he had been a target.3" Summarized briefly, the plaintiff
subsequently lost in the Maryland state courts, lost in the District of Columbia federal court, and lost in the Maryland federal court.39 He then began
the instant litigation, his fourth suit, in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia.
The trial judge dismissed all counts of the complaint based on the res
judicata effect of the rulings in the three previous suits.' ° He denied a request for sanctions, but warned the plaintiff that sanctions would be reconsidered if the plaintiff persisted in attempting to relitigate previously
adjudicated claims.4 1 Nonetheless, there came a flood of post-judgment motions from plaintiff. A sanction of more than $12,900 was imposed; 42 the
court of appeals affirmed in an opinion by Judge Bork.
Another example of the kind of patently frivolous case clearly within the
43
ambit of rule 11 is Thiel v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association.
Briefly, the case began as a mortgage default for failure to carry insurance on
the financed property, but spawned an independent pro se action by the defaulting parties based on some very peculiar theories concerning the monement in the pretrial area."); see also Flanders, Blind Umpires-A Response to ProfessorResnik,
35 HASTINGS L.J. 505 (1984); Peckham, The FederalJudge as a Case Manager: The New Role
in Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 770 (1981).
36. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(f).

37.
38.
39.
40.

803 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
Id. at 1200.
Id.
Id. at 1201.

41. Id.
42. Id.
43. 646 F. Supp. 592 (N.D. Ind. 1986).
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tary system." The plaintiffs were warned by the court that their case was
without merit, warned by the court of similar cases in which sanctions had
been imposed, and warned by the court of the possibility of sanctions in their
case.45 Nonetheless, in the words of the court, the "plaintiffs refused to take
the final step and abandon a cause of action that obviously has abused the
judicial system.",4 6 The court imposed sanctions in the form of a $3,600 fine
for the cost of six hours of the court's time based on a figure of $600 per
hour, plus attorneys' fees and costs to the opposing party.47
McLaughlin and Thiel are but two examples of the kind of frivolous litigation that finds its way into federal court. It is sometimes surprising to see
the number of cases based on impossible theories, such as cases involving the
constitutionality of the income tax, or the number of cases that try to tangle
the court in procedural knots, for example, with numerous discovery motions. Such cases are of great concern to judges because of the time each can
take. Imposition of sanctions is intended to send a message to those who are
found to be toying with the system. In colloquial terms, the message to
those who want to play games with the courts is simply: Go play in someone
else's sandbox.
This message is also reflected in cases such as Davis v. Veslan Enterprises, a wrongful death action brought in a Texas state court that arose
out of a truck accident. A jury rendered a verdict of $1 million in compensatory damages and $12 million in punitive damages. 49 After plaintiff moved
for judgment on the verdict, but before a scheduled hearing on the motion,
defendant filed a petition for removal to federal court.5 There was no real
basis for removal; the federal court found that the argument for removal
44. Id. at 593-95.
45. Id. at 597-98.
46. Id. at 598.
47. Id. In setting a value on the court's time, the district court cited Levin & Colliers,
supra note 11, at 226-27, which reported that a 1982 study sponsored by the Rand Corporation
Institute for Civil Justice had concluded that a single hour spent by a federal judge in a tort
case costs the government approximately $600. See J. KAKALIK & A. ROBYN, COSTS OF THE
CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM:

COURT EXPENDITURES FOR PROCESSING TORT CASES

49 (Rand

Institute for Civil Justice 1982). Judge Lee, who decided Thiel, has indicated on several other
occasions that he will use this formula when imposing fines under rule 11 to compensate the
government for the court's time. See Robinson v. Moses, 644 F. Supp. 975, 982-83 (N.D. Ind.
1986); Dominguez v. Figel, 626 F. Supp. 368, 374 (N.D. Ind. 1986); Hilgeford v. Peoples
Bank, 110 F.R.D. 700, 702 (N.D. Ind. 1986). Other judges have indicated approval of this
formula. See Dyson v. Sposeep, 637 F. Supp. 616, 624 (N.D. Ind. 1986) (Miller, J.); Advo Sys.
v. Walters, 110 F.R.D. 426, 433 (E.D. Mich. 1986) (Pratt, C.J.).
48. 765 F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1985).
49. Id. at 496.
50. Id.
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lacked "plausibility." 51 Rather, the court inferred that defendant filed for
removal in an attempt to save money, because there could not be an entry of
judgment until the case was remanded to the state court and, under Texas
law at that time, no interest could run until judgment was entered.52 Accordingly, the court imposed sanctions of more than $5,800 in attorneys'
fees, plus almost $33,000 in lost interest.5 3 These sanctions were affirmed by
the court of appeals.
In cases where the limits of rule 11 have been tested, there have been some
fortunate developments in the appellate courts. Golden Eagle Distributing
Corp. v. Burroughs Corp.5 4 was a diversity case that involved complex questions of change of venue and choice of law. The district court imposed sanctions on the defendant for misleading the court by presenting an argument
for the extension of existing law as one warranted under existing law,55 and
56
for failing to disclose all adverse authority.
The court of appeals reversed, 7 holding that rule 11 "does not impose
upon the district courts the burden of evaluating under ethical standards the
accuracy of all lawyers' arguments." 58 The court explained, in part, that:
This use of Rule 11, far from avoiding excess litigation, increases
it. We must not interpret Rule 11 to create two ladders for afterthe-fact review of asserted unethical conduct: one consisting of
sanction procedures, the other consisting of the well-established
bar and court ethical procedures. Utilizing Rule 1 to sanction
motions or pleadings not well-grounded in fact or law, or papers
filed for improper purposes, gives full and ample play to the 1983
amendment.5 9
In our view, Golden Eagle reaches a desirable result not only for technical
reasons, but for reasons of policy as well. The appellate court makes clear
that rule 11 is neither a panacea for all ills nor an enforcement mechanism
for all rules of professional responsibility. 6' Viewed from a narrow perspec51. Id. at 500.

52. Id.
53. Id. at 497. Another example of harassing

litigation tactics that have been sanctioned
are frivolous motions to disqualify opposing counsel. North Am. Foreign Trading Corp. v.
Zale Corp., 83 F.R.D. 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). See Oliphant, supra note 35, at 763-64.
54. 103 F.R.D. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1984), rev'd, 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986).
55. 103 F.R.D. at 125-28.
56. Id. at 128-29.
57. 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986).
58. Id. at 1542.

59. Id.
60. But cf Blackwell v. Department of Offender Rehabilitation, 807 F.2d 914, 915-16
(11 th Cir. 1987) (upholding imposition of rule 11 sanctions against attorney for failure to
discharge "duty of candor" in seeking attorneys' fees after settlement of § 1983 action without
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tive, it would indeed be unfortunate if rule 11, with its provision for
mandatory sanctions even on the court's own motion, were read to encompass the full range of ethical trespasses. No matter how minimal the penalties, bench-bar relations would inevitably be exacerbated. Viewed more
broadly, an attempt to make rule 11 do too much could be expected to be
counterproductive. As with so many things in life, the effort to do too much
results in less being accomplished than would have been the case with a
more realistic program.
The courts of appeals have also taken a balanced approach in another
regard. Rule 11 specifically mentions attorneys' fees as an appropriate sanction. 61 The law of attorneys' fees is a complex, technical area. 62 Formulas
and methodologies have been developed based on "lodestar figures" and
"multipliers." 6 3 A potentially no less complicated "12-factor" formula was
developed," but seems to be falling out of favor. 65 A recent series of
Supreme Court cases 6 6 has addressed a number of the issues arising in attorneys' fee litigation, yet some issues remain unresolved.6 7
Thus far, however, the esoterica that characterizes the law of attorneys'
fees has not been imported into the law of sanctions. 68 The assessment of
sanctions in rule 11 cases-including awards of attorneys' fees-is less precise. Generally, the courts are concerned more with reasonableness and fairness in determining how large a sanction to impose, rather than with the
disclosing to court that such claims were foreclosed under the terms of the settlement); Jorgenson v. County of Volusia, 625 F. Supp. 1543, 1547-49 (M.D. Fla. 1986) (sanction of $500 fine

imposed on counsel for "misleading and unethical representation of the controlling law;" court
emphasized the "reprehensible" conduct of counsel in "deliberately" omitting controlling authority from a memorandum of law, especially when counsel had personally participated in
one of the controlling cases).
61.

FED. R. Civ. P. 11.

62. For a recent survey of the various procedures and techniques used to handle attorney's fee requests, see A. ToMKINS & T. WILLGING, TAXATION OF ATTORNEY'S FEES: PRACTICES IN ENGLISH, ALASKAN AND FEDERAL COURTS 49-77 (Federal Judicial Center 1986).

63. See, e.g., Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,
487 F.2d 161, 167-68 (3d Cir. 1973) (Lindy I); Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radia-

tor & Standard Sanitary Corp., 540 F.2d 102, 112-22 (3d Cir. 1976) (Lindy II).
64. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974).
65. See Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 106 S.Ct. 3088,
3097 (1986) (Lindy lodestar formulation provides "a more analytical framework for lower

courts to follow than the unguided 'factors' approach provided by Johnson.").
66. See Delaware Valley, 106 S.Ct. at 3088; City of Riverside v. Rivera, 106 S. Ct. 2686
(1986); Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983).
67. Delaware Valley, 106 S.Ct. at 3100 (ordering reargument on the risk of loss multiplier

issue).
68. See, e.g., Davis v. Veslan Enters., 765 F.2d 494, 500 n. 12 (5th Cir. 1985) (In calculating attorneys' fees awarded as a sanction under rule 11, the district court was not required to
use the "detailed analysis" set forth in Johnson.).

1987]

Developing Law of Sanctions

technique by which the sanction is calculated. 6 9 The courts of appeals recognize that sanctions under rule 11 serve several purposes-punishment and
deterrence, e.g., as well as compensation, 70 and are, therefore, inclined to
rely on the trial court to impose a sanction that serves either or both of these
purposes, rather than fine tune or second-guess the judgment of the district
courts. 7 1 Moreover, in contrast with the situation in which an award of attorneys' fees is of right, in the rule 11 cases, the entire award is discretionary.
True, sanctions may be mandatory, but both the selection of attorneys' fees
as a sanction, as well as the amount awarded, are expressly within the discretion of the trial judge.7 2
In general, appellate courts have responded well in honoring trial court
69. See, e.g., United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local No. 115 v. Armour &

Co., 106 F.R.D. 345, 349 (N.D. Cal. 1985) ("rule 11 only authorizes 'reasonable' fees, not
necessarily actual fees").
70. For discussions of the various purposes that sanctions are thought to serve, see
Nelken, supra note 8, at 1323-25; Oliphant, supra note 35, at 739-40; Schwarzer, supra note 10,
at 201. Almost 60% of the 292 federal district judges responding to a Federal Judicial Center
study expressed a belief that deterrence is the most important purpose of sanctions. S. KASSIN,
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RULE 11 SANCTIONS 29 (Federal Judicial Center 1985).
71. See, e.g., Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1281 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 55
U.S.L.W. 3602 (U.S. Mar. 10, 1987). In particular, the court of appeals stated:
[G]iven the underlying purpose of sanctions-to punish deviations from proper standards of conduct with a view toward encouraging future compliance and deterring
further violations-it lies well within the district court's discretion to temper the
amount to be awarded against an offending attorney by a balancing consideration of
his ability to pay.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Unioil, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 809 F.2d 548, 559 (9th Cir.
1986) (award of $294,141.10 of expenses and attorneys' fees was not "patently unreasonable in
light of the massive liability that the complaint ... threatened to impose upon multiple defendants"); Davis v. Veslan Enters., 765 F.2d at 501 ("[c]onsidering the facts of the case ... and
the particular abuse the district court sought to deter, the district court's use of an interest
calculation to tailor the amount of the sanction was most appropriate"). 72. See Unioil, 809 F.2d at 559; Oliveri, 803 F.2d at 1280; Davis, 765 F.2d at 500-01;
Robinson v. National Cash Register Co., 808 F.2d 1119, 1126 & n. 12 (5th Cir. 1987); Albright
v. Upjohn Co., 788 F.2d 1217, 1222 (6th Cir. 1986); Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 770 F.2d
1168, 1174-75 (D.C. Cir. 1985). But cf Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254
& n.7 (2d Cir. 1985) (Eastway 1) (while noting that district courts retain broad discretion in
fashioning appropriate sanctions, the court of appeals remanded to the district court with instructions that "appropriate" sanctions on this case "shall include" expenses, including attorneys' fees).
On remand, the trial judge interpreted the court of appeals' decision to be a holding that
failure to impose attorney's fees would be an abuse of discretion. Constr. Corp. v. City of New
York, 637 F. Supp. 558, 577 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (Eastway I1).
The various standards of review that may be applicable in rule 11 cases have been stated
succinctly as follows:
If the facts relied upon by the district court to establish a violation of the Rule are
disputed on appeal, we review the factual determinations of the district court under a
clearly erroneous standard. If the legal conclusion of the district court that the facts
constitute a violation of the Rule is disputed, we review that legal conclusion de novo.
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discretion and in displaying a deferential standard toward the judges who, in
the words of Judge MacKinnon in one rule 11 case, have "tasted the flavor
of the litigation.",73 District courts have employed the broad discretion
granted them by the rule to impose a variety of sanctions, including fines to
compensate the government for the court's time,7 4 and reprimands. 7 51 Some
judges, in addition to imposing monetary sanctions, have required certification from the sanctioned attorney that every lawyer in the firm receive a
copy of the opinion.7 6 Indeed, simply publishing an opinion imposing sanc7
tions can, in itself, constitute a very severe sanction.
It would be wrong to suggest that appellate courts have abdicated their
role in contributing to the developing law of sanctions. A plethora of appellate opinions testifies to the contrary.78 Yet, the willingness to respect the
discretion of the trial judge is clearly evident and sharply reduces the risk of
what would otherwise be an intolerably burdensome proliferation of satellite
litigation. The appellate courts have chosen a more balanced approach,
which constitutes a major contribution toward developing a practicable program in which sanctions play an appropriate, and not a counterproductive,
role.
There is yet another area in which appellate courts have demonstrated a
desire to achieve a balanced approach in the use of rule 11. They have
shown a commendable awareness of the realities of litigation and a sensitivity to the fact that sanctionable tactics are often rooted in improprieties of
the adversary. Fighting fire with fire may not always be a defense, but it
would be wrong to ignore blatant provocation where it exists. Thus, in
Mossman v. Roadway Express, Inc.,7a case involving race and sex discrimiFinally, if the appropriateness of the sanction imposed is challenged, we review the
sanction under an abuse of discretion standard.
Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 828 (9th Cir. 1986). Accord Robinson, 808 F.2d
at 1126.
73. Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 770 F.2d 1168, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
74. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
75. Allen v. Faragasso, 585 F. Supp. 1114, 1119 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
76. This requirement has been imposed on several occasions by Judge William W
Schwarzer. See, e.g., Larkin v. Heckler, 584 F. Supp. 512, 514 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (order must
be shown to all assistant United States attorneys in district engaged in social security litigation); Huettig & Schromm, Inc. v. Landscape Contractors Council, 582 F. Supp. 1519, 152223 (N.D. Cal. 1984), aff'd, 790 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1986); Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v.
Burroughs Corp., 103 F.R.D. 124, 129 (N.D. Cal. 1984), rev'd on othergroun4 801 F.2d 1531
(9th Cir. 1986).
77. See Schwarzer, supra note 10, at 202; see generally Nelken, supra note 8, at 1326.
78. Our LEXIS search performed on March 5, 1987 generated 161 cases from the 13
federal circuit courts of appeals that have discussed sanctions in the context of rule 1I since
August 1, 1983.
79. 789 F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1986).
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nation claims, the plaintiff was sanctioned for bringing an improper motion
for summary judgment, and was ordered to pay $5,500 to compensate the
defendant for attorneys' fees incurred in responding to the motion.8 0 The
court of appeals agreed that the plaintiff's conduct was sanctionable, but was
concerned that the defendant, too, had engaged in sanctionable conduct by
pleading thirty-seven affirmative defenses in answer to the original complaint.81 Properly, the appellate court made no effort to resolve such questions on appeal. Instead, it remanded to the district court to consider what
portion, if any, of the attorneys' fees awarded were attributable to the defendant's conduct. The district court was therefore instructed to reconsider
the amount of attorneys' fees awarded in light of the defendant's own
misconduct.82
III.

"CHILLING" EFFECTS AND CONTINUING OBLIGATIONS

As already noted, commentators have expressed concern over the potential "chilling" effect of the new approach to sanctions on legitimate advocacy, and the "reasonable inquiry" and certification requirements of rule 11
have been the focus of that concern. 3 In particular, the fear has been expressed that "the amendments articulate a standard for avoiding sanctions
that requires a complaint to specify legal and factual bases to a fuller extent
than that necessary to survive a motion to dismiss. "84
Such concerns, however, should be allayed by appellate court decisions
holding that the amendments to rule 11 do not modify the standards for
summary judgment and dismissal, and that "[a] plaintiff does not have to
be prepared to meet a summary judgment motion as soon as the complaint is
filed.",8 6 The appellate decisions indicate that while rule 11 has changed
what a party must do before it can plead, it has not altered the pleading
requirements. In functional terms, these cases typically turn on whether,
and to what extent, discovery will be available to plaintiffs who have made
reasonable inquiry before filing, but who must have the benefit of at least
some discovery if they are to survive pretrial motions to dismiss.
In Kamen v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., s7 for example, the
80. Id at 806.

81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See, e.g., Nelken, supra note 8, at 133843; PlausiblePleadings, supra note 8, at 63444; Reasonable Inquiry, supra note 8; Rothstein & Wolfe, supra note 8.
84. Plausible Pleadings,supra note 8, at 634.
85. Kamen v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 791 F.2d 1006, 1011-12 (2d Cir. 1986).
86. Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1279 (2d Cir. 1986) (citing Kamen, 791 F.2d at
1011-12), cert. denied, 55 U.S.L.W. 3607 (U.S. Mar. 10, 1987).
87. 791 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1986).
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plaintiff brought an action against her employer under the Rehabilitation
Act.8" As a jurisdictional matter, the plaintiff had to show that AT&T received "federal financial assistance" as defined by the Act.89 The defense
counsel informed the plaintiff's counsel that the company received no such
assistance, and threatened to seek sanctions if the plaintiff did not voluntarily discontinue the action.9" The plaintiff's counsel responded that he was
not about to dismiss a claim solely upon his adversary's representations, particularly in view of the broad and technical statutory definition of "assistance," and requested information on transactions by which the company
received federal funds or services. 9 He offered to dismiss the action if the
information showed that the company did not receive federal financial assistance. The defendants ignored the plaintiff's offer, however, and moved for
dismissal and for sanctions under rule 11, which were granted by the district
court.

92

The court of appeals reversed, holding that it was improper for the district
court to deny the plaintiff limited discovery on the jurisdictional question.9 3
The court held that rule 11 does not modify the standards for summary
judgment or dismissal, and further found that the district court's application
of rule 11 had the effect of preventing a party who was opposing a summary
judgment motion from obtaining discovery of facts that were exclusively or
largely in the adversary's possession.94
The Second Circuit reiterated this reasoning in Oliveri v. Thompson, 95 a
civil rights action involving unconstitutional arrest and other claims.
Among the sanctions imposed against the attorney, but reversed by the court
of appeals, were sanctions for claims against a county and its police commissioner for failure to supervise the police officers involved. 96 The court of
appeals acknowledged that these allegations had the appearance of "boilerplate," but concluded that without formal discovery it would be unlikely for
any citizen to be in possession of information either supporting or negating
such claims. 97
We recognize ... that when commencing a suit of this type neither
the plaintiff nor his attorney is likely to know much about the rele88. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).

89. 791 F.2d at 1008.
90. Id.

91. Id. at 1008-09.
92. Id. at 1009.
93. Id. at 1011.
94. Id. at 1011-12.

95. 803 F.2d 1265, 1279 (2d Cir. 1986).

96. Id. at 1278-79.
97. Id. at 1279.
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vant internal operations of the police department, nor about the
disciplinary history and record of the particular police officers involved. In view of the strong policies favoring suits protecting the
constitutional rights of citizens, we think it would be inappropriate
to require plaintiffs and their attorneys before commencing suit to
obtain the detailed information needed to prove a pattern of supervisory misconduct ....A plaintiff does not have to be prepared to
meet a summary judgment motion as soon as the complaint is
98
filed.
This is not to say that rule 11 has not affected a party's ability to bring
suit, particularly in cases where prefiling investigation is available to establish the basis for a claim, or lack thereof. When reasonable inquiry should
have revealed that a claim has no legal or factual basis, but the claim is filed
nonetheless, the appellate courts have found that rule 11 sanctions are appropriate, and plaintiffs are not entitled to further discovery.
This was the situation in Albright v. Upjohn,99 where the plaintiff brought
suit against nine pharmaceutical manufacturers, even though investigation
of available medical records revealed that only three of the defendants had
actually supplied the medication in issue. The claims against the other defendants were dismissed after they moved for summary judgment and the
plaintiff amended the complaint to remove them as defendants, but the district court denied a request for sanctions by one of the former defendants."
The court of appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the prefiling investigation conducted by the plaintiff's attorneys was insufficient because it
failed to disclose that the claim against that particular defendant was
grounded in fact or that there was "any likelihood that additional medical
records would be located that could not have been found through reasonable
10 1
inquiry prior to filing."
98. Id. (quoting Kamen v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 791 F.2d 1006, 1011-12 (2d Cir.

1986)).
99. 788 F.2d 1217 (6th Cir. 1986).

100. Id. at 1219-20.
101. Id. at 1221. In a similar "enterprise liability" case, the Third Circuit recently reversed

sanctions of more than $165,000 against attorneys who brought suit against 96 chemical manufacturers, 89 of whom were subsequently dismissed. Glaser v. Cincinnati Milacron, Inc., 808
F.2d 285 (3d Cir. 1986). Applying the pre-amendment version of rule 11, the court found that
the attorneys' prefiling investigation was not so lacking as to constitute subjective bad faith
under the former rule 11 standard. Id. at 291. The court noted, however, that it expressed no

opinion as to whether counsel's "limited investigation" would be sufficient under the reasonable inquiry standard of rule 11 as amended. Id. at 291 n.5.
Similarly, commentators have warned that the once prevalent practice in malpractice cases

"of including as defendants all doctors, nurses, and orderlies on call at the time of the event
would now be likely to result" in rule 11 sanctions. Rothschild, Fenton & Swanson, Rule 11:
Stop, Think & Investigate, 11 LrrIGATION, Winter 1985, at 13, 15.
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Thus, the cases have taken a balanced approach in defining "reasonable
inquiry." Heeding the Advisory Committee's admonition that what constitutes reasonable inquiry may depend on a variety of factors,' °2 the courts
have looked to the practicalities in deciding what is reasonable. When the
relevant information is exclusively, or at least realistically, in the hands of
the defendants, then the plaintiff is, and should be, entitled to discovery.
This is not to suggest a right to proceed with full discovery ranging over all
the issues of the case, but rather a grant of limited discovery for a limited
purpose with the limitations defined by the realities of the situation. Thus, if
the threshold issue is one of jurisdiction and, applying this standard, the
plaintiff is entitled to discovery, that entitlement is limited to what is relevant to determining jurisdiction. 103 When, however, information that would
negate a claim is reasonably available prior to filing, and the claim is nevertheless filed, rule 11 sanctions properly come into play."°
Closely related is the question of whether rule 11 imposes any continuing
obligations. What happens when reasonable prefiling inquiry indicates that
a claim or defense is well-grounded in fact and law, but subsequent discovery
reveals that the claim is baseless? Is there a continuing obligation constantly
to reexamine one's pleadings and other papers, and to modify or withdraw
them as a case develops? There are intimations in the case law' 0 5 and commentary 0 6 that the rule does impose a duty on attorneys to review and reevaluate their positions as new facts come to light, or otherwise risk
sanctions.
We believe, however, that the better position concerning continuing obligations has been taken by the Second Circuit in Oliveri, which stated that
"[r]ule 11 applies only to the initial signing of a 'pleading, motion or other
102. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note. The note stated that:
[W]hat constitutes a reasonable inquiry may depend on such factors as how much
time for investigation was available to the signer; whether he had to rely on a client
for information as to the facts underlying the pleading, motion, or other paper;
whether the pleading, motion, or other paper was based on a plausible view of the
law; or whether he depended on forwarding counsel or another member of the bar.

Id.
103. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
104. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
105. See, e.g., Robinson v. National Cash Register Co., 808 F.2d 1119, 1127 (5th Cir. 1987)
("[R]ule I1 is not a one time only obligation. Counsel have a continuing obligation to review
and reevaluate their position as the case develops.") (dicta); Woodfork v. Gavin, 105 F.R.D.
100, 104 (N.D. Miss. 1985) ("If an attorney subsequently becomes aware of information or
evidence which reasonably leads him to believe that there is no factual or legal basis for his
position ... then that attorney is under an obligation to re-evaluate the earlier certification of
the cause under Rule I L.") (dicta).
106. See Nelken, supra note 8, at 1331; Parness, Groundless Pleadingsand Certifying Attorneys in the FederalCourts, 1985 UTAH L. REV. 325, 337-42; Schwarzer, supra note 10, at 200.
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paper.' "107 Like the court in Oliveri, we believe the plain language of the
rule limits its application to conduct at the time of signing."' 8 This is stated
clearly enough in the advisory committee note.109 Moreover, as the court
noted in Oliveri, the drafters of the rule could have easily extended its reach
if they so desired; the duty to supplement or to amend created by rule
26(e) 1 0 provided a readily available model. The failure so to provide was
hardly inadvertent.
In addition, there are several other reasons why we believe rule 11 should
not be expanded to include a continuing obligation. First, inquiry into what
a party or attorney knew can be difficult enough; expanding the inquiry to
include when he or she knew it inevitably invites the kind of satellite litigation the drafters sought to avoid. Second, because rule 11 applies to "other
papers" in addition to pleadings, sanctions can be imposed for continuing to
assert a baseless claim in such subsequent filings as notices of deposition or
trial briefs, without resort to any continuing obligation to modify groundless
pleadings.11 Of course, where sanctions otherwise become appropriate, a
party's persistence in pursuing a groundless claim may be relevant to choice
of sanctions.
Finally, in truly egregious cases, other sources of authority exist to impose
a claim even well
sanctions against an attorney who continues to1 1 pursue
2
after it is apparent that the claim is groundless.
IV.

DUE PROCESS CONSIDERATIONS

The Advisory Committee, in its notes to amended rule 11, foresaw the
107. Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1274 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 55 U.S.L.W.
3602 (U.S. Mar. 10, 1987).
108. Id.
109. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note ("The court is expected to avoid using
the wisdom of hindsight and should test the signer's conduct by inquiring what was reasonable
to believe at the time the pleading, motion, or other paper was submitted.").
110. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(e).
111. Moreover, it has been noted that the amendments to rules 16 and 26, by extending
attorney liability to pretrial conferences and to all discovery requests, responses, and objections, impose potential liability for conduct throughout the pretrial process. Sherman & Kinnard, Federal CourtDiscovery in the 80's-Making the Rules Work, 95 F.R.D. 245, 282 (1982).
112. See, e.g., Woodfork v. Gavin, 105 F.R.D. at 105-06 (imposing sanctions under both
rule 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927); Steinberg v. St. Regis/Sheraton Hotel, 583 F. Supp. 421, 425-26
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (citing § 706(k) of tit. VII, the "bad faith" exception to the "American Rule"
against awards of attorneys' fees, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and rule 11 as authority for award of
attorneys' fees); Van Berkel v. Fox Farm & Road Mach., 581 F. Supp. 1248, 1251 (D. Minn.
1984) (imposing sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 for failing to dismiss suit after learning that
it was barred by statute of limitations); see also Parness, supra note 106, at 339-42 (suggesting
that local rules or the courts' inherent authority may provide authorization for postfiling certification responsibilities).
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possibility that litigation over the imposition of sanctions, if allowed to flourish unchecked, could more than offset the efficiency that the amendments

were designed to promote.'1 3 It could create the sort of sideshow series of
hearings and appeals that Professor Arthur Miller, reporter to the Advisory
Committee, has described as his "Kafkaesque dream.""' 4 This recurrent
nightmare culminates when a sanction motion is denied, at which point the
vindicated party leaps up and says: "I hereby move to sanction the sanction
115
motion."
Certainly, due process is required in order to impose sanctions.' 1 6 Precisely how much process is due in each of a myriad of factual situations can
be a challenging intellectual question. Of greater concern is the practical
question: Will the courts find themselves mired in the processes necessary to
enforce the rules designed to simplify? Sanctions for discovery abuse, for
example, could in theory give rise to the need for several rounds of discovery
to challenge the need for sanctions, to dispute the selected sanctions, and to
mitigate the severity of proposed sanctions.
The draftsmen foresaw the potential problem and warned against so bizarre a result. Discovery concerning sanctions was to be "only by leave of
the court, and then only in extraordinary circumstances." ' 17 The scope of
sanctions proceedings must, in the normal case, be limited to the record." 8
The Advisory Committee's admonition to avoid satellite litigation does seem
113. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (seeking to assure that "efficiencies
achieved through more effective operation of the pleading regimen will not be offset by the cost
of satellite litigation").
114. A. Miller, Remarks at Annual Judicial Conference of the Second Judicial Circuit of
the United States (Sept. 30, 1983), reprinted in 101 F.R.D. 161, 200 (1984).
115. Id.; see also A. MILLER, supra note 6, at 41. A scenario similar to Professor Miller's
nightmare has indeed occurred in Stevens v. Lawyers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 789 F.2d 1056 (4th
Cir. 1986), in which the plaintiff responded to the defendant's rule 11 motion by moving to
sanction the sanction motion. The district court granted the defendant's motion for sanctions,
denied the plaintiff's motion for sanctions, and awarded defendant costs incurred in responding to the plaintiff's sanction motion. Id. at 1059. The court of appeals found that the district
court abused its discretion in granting the defendant's motion, but affirmed the denial of the
plaintiff's motion for sanctions. Id. at 1060-61. The appellate court did not deal explicitly
with the award of costs to the defendant.
116. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 767 (1980) ("Like other sanctions,
attorney's fees certainly should not be assessed lightly or without fair notice and an opportunity for a hearing on the record."). As discussed infra, the nature of the process that is due
varies with the circumstances of each case; the relevant due process considerations in rule 11
cases are developing in the emerging case law.
117. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
118. Id. ("In many situations the judge's participation in the proceedings provides him
with full knowledge of the relevant facts and little further inquiry will be necessary ....
ITihe
court must to the extent possible limit the scope of sanction proceedings to the record.").

1987]

Developing Law of Sanctions

to have been met with some measure of success, largely because of five factors that mitigate to some degree the need for formal sanction proceedings.
First, judicial notice is available, and the record itself is before the court
that is considering whether and what sanctions are appropriate. 19 Nor
should one underestimate what court records can yield. In a suit against a
deputy sheriff for warrantless entry into the home of a suspect who was
killed in the process, the assistant state's attorney defending the deputy sheriff made an assertion concerning the defendant's motivation.1 20 The assertion was flatly contradicted, however, by the deputy sheriff's own
deposition. There was no need for a hearing on the issue of sanctions. The
1 21
deposition was available for all to read, and a $400 sanction was imposed.
The size of the sanction was modest enough, but the fact that a monetary
sanction had been imposed was not likely to be lost on others.
Second, concessions are often made by a party to the litigation, sometimes
expressly, sometimes by clear implication.' 22 This, too, can eliminate the
need for an elaborate sanction proceeding.
Third, a party subject to sanctions certainly has a right to a hearing, but
not necessarily to an evidentiary hearing.' 23 Moreover, it is a little late to
it was evident
argue on appeal that no sanctions hearing was afforded, when
24
asking.1
the
for
below
had
been
have
that a hearing could
Fourth, sometimes the appeal itself, with its briefs and supporting papers,
is adequate to satisfy due process, either alone or supplemented by a remand
119. Id. See McLaughlin v. Bradlee, 803 F.2d 1197, 1205-06 (D.C. Cir. 1986) which
reasoned:
The trial court, as a primary participant in the proceedings, had already observed
those elements of the litigation most relevant to the criteria for imposing sanctions
under the rule, most notably [the plaintiff's] conduct during the trial. While a hearing might on some occasions aid in examining the financial situation of a litigant
upon whom sanctions are to be imposed, here [the plaintiff] concedes that such information may be found in the record.
Id.; see also Mohammed v. Union Carbide Corp., 606 F. Supp. 252, 262 (E.D. Mich. 1985)
("Plaintiff's failure to conduct any investigation whatsoever into [defamation] claims is apparent from the present record.").
120. Frazier v. Cast, 771 F.2d 259, 265 (7th Cir. 1985).
121. Id. at 263-66.
122. See, e.g., McLaughlin, 803 F.2d at 1206 (plaintiff concedes that information relevant
to imposition of sanctions may be found in the record); Mohammed, 606 F. Supp. at 261
("plaintiff conceded at his deposition that he had no evidence" to support allegations of
defamation).
123. Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d at 1265, 1280 (2d Cir. 1986) cert. denied, 55 U.S.L.W.
3602 (U.S. Mar. 10, 1987); Davis v. Veslan Enters., 765 F.2d 494, 500 n.12 (5th Cir. 1985).
124. See, e.g., Lepucki v. Van Wormer, 765 F.2d 86, 88 (7th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 86 (1985) ("appellant, having voluntarily chosen not to attend [hearing on
costs and fees] cannot now complain that he is entitled to additional process").
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on a narrow issue. This was the case in Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 125 in
which the court of appeals reversed the trial court's denial of sanctions
against CBS for bringing a groundless petition to hold a nonparty witness in
contempt for refusing to consent to a videotape of his deposition.' 2 6 The
appellate court determined that sanctions were appropriate under rule 11,
but remanded to the district court for assessment of costs and expenses.' 2 7
Finally, if a sanctioned party causes additional delays by bringing a frivolous appeal-frivolity piled on frivolity-the courts do not hesitate to impose sanctions on appeal, on a variety of theories.'12 In re Itel Securities
Litigation 129 is a useful example. The case involved a lawyer who was sanctioned by the trial court for objecting to a class action settlement, solely to
30
improve his own bargaining position regarding fees in an unrelated case.'
The findings of the district court as to these facts went unchallenged.' 3 ' On
appeal, the lawyer argued that the petition clause of the first amendment of
the United States Constitution guaranteed the right of any citizen to present
any petition-however frivolous-and to do so without penalty. 32 Said the
appellate court: "This contention is frivolous,"' 133 and promptly imposed
sanctions for bringing the appeal.
In the final analysis, sanctions will prove successful if they create a climate
in which both the need for sanctions is drastically reduced and the standards
125. 770 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1985).

126. Id. at 1170.
127. Id. at 1179-80 (imposition of costs incurred both in the district court and on appeal

were to be considered).
128. See, e.g., In re Kelly, 808 F.2d 549, 551 (7th Cir. 1986) (FED. R. APP. P. 46(c) allows
appellate court to impose discipline on an attorney "for conduct unbecoming a member of the
bar" and rule 11 requirements "help to define conduct becoming a member of the bar"); In re
Itel Sec. Litig., 791 F.2d 672, 676 (9th Cir. 1986) (awarding costs and attorneys' fees on appeal
pursuant to FED. R. APP. P. 38); Thornton v. Wahl, 787 F.2d 1151, 1153 (7th Cir. 1986)
(imposing sanctions pursuant to rule 11 for frivolous appellate proceedings); Westmoreland v.
CBS, Inc., 770 F.2d 1168, 1179-80 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (rule 11 authorizes award of expenses and
attorneys' fees on appeal that are incurred because of the filing of groundless petition); see also
McLaughlin v. Bradlee, 803 F.2d 1197, 1206 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (placing attorneys on notice that
court intends to impose sanctions under FED. R. APP. P. 38 and 28 U.S.C. § 1912 for frivolous
appeals); cf Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. NLRB, 809 F.2d 419, 425 (7th Cir. 1987) (imposing
sanctions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 for filing a brief that did not comply with the court's
margin, spacing, and typepoint requirements, which as a result exceeded the court's 50-page
limit) ("[o]ne has the sense that the lawyers wrote what they wanted and told the word
processing department to jigger the formatting controls until the brief had been reduced to 50
pages").
129. 791 F.2d 672 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 880 (1987).
130. Id. at 674.
131. Id.
132. 791 F.2d at 676.
133. Id.
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of professional responsibility are understood and adhered to in a way that
precludes the use of financial attrition as an accepted litigation tactic. The
more severe the sanction imposed, the more questionable the application of
rule 11 to the particular conduct complained of, the more likely will be the
demand for the fullest range of procedures in the sanctioning process.
Achieving a sense of balance in the implementation of rule 11 will, in itself,
go far toward reducing the risk of excessive satellite litigation.
V.

CONCLUSION

The maze of technicalities and mass of detail that seem inevitably to accompany implementation of any change in procedural rules tend to obscure
any sense of overall purpose. Lost in minutiae, concerned with parsing the
words of an amended rule and the cases that have interpreted it, one may be
forgiven for wondering at times whether the effort is worthwhile, whether it
really makes a difference.
At such times it can be useful to consider Judge Griffin Bell's statement of
the relationship of effective procedures to the delivery of justice:
Constitutional guarantees of human rights ring hollow if there is
no forum available in fact for their vindication. Statutory rights
become empty promises if adjudication is too long delayed to make
them meaningful or the value of a claim is consumed by the exfunctioning smoothly
pense of asserting it. Only if our courts are
13 4
can equal justice become a reality for all.
And at times it is even helpful to be reminded of the role of justice in our
society. Perhaps Edmund Cahn best articulated what ought to be our common aspiration when he wrote: "I see a world where no nation is accounted
rich except in compassion, or secure except in freestrong except in justice,
135
peace."'
dom and

134. THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 300 (A.L.
Levin & R. Wheeler eds. 1979).
135. E. CAHN, THE PREDICAMENT OF DEMOCRATIC MAN 187 (1961).

